

and the effort which it costs us to do so seems to prove that the process is actively original and is not the resultant of predetermining impressions. The "determinist" theory, which denies the existence of free will, is attractive to those who are inclined to view Life as the result of mechanical or chemical causes. If Life is simply a series of reactions to external stimuli, there is no place in it for either consciousness or free will. Free will may be ruled out of existence as an illusion, if we dignify as the *causes* of our behaviour the facts of our experience which necessarily *condition* it. The existence of consciousness cannot possibly be denied. But it is regarded by this school of thought as a functionless superfluity, to be compared with the sparks that fly off from an electrical machine, the shadow of a moving object, or the humming of a top. Yet in spite of these explanations we feel that we possess free will as well as consciousness, and can use them for active purposes. We can treat consciousness as an accident and free will as an illusion only if we disregard introspective observations which, in such a matter as the appraisement of our mental faculties, are an infinitely safer guide than inferences that are based upon our experience of inanimate things. The most materialistic of philosophers does not venture to repudiate altogether the promptings of these feelings. He will not deny the existence of consciousness. But he

distrusts
their revelations when they contradict
the conclusions to which he is led by the
inferences that he draws from material happenings.
We are, however, compelled to trust to
introspection for most of the knowledge which we
possess of our mental processes, and it is unreasonable
to discard it in one province of our enquiry.
simply because its promptings are out of accord with
our experi-